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Abstract: “Image scoring” is a type of social evaluation, originally used in agent-based models,
where the reputation of another is numerically assessed. This phenomenon has been studied in both
theoretical models and real-life psychology experiments (using human participants). The latter are
aimed to create conditions in the laboratory where image scoring can be elicited. One influential
paper is that of Wedekind and Milinski (2000), WM. Our paper is a replication of that study,
deliberately employing very similar methodology to the original. Accordingly, we had six groups
of ten participants play an economic game. In each round, each player was randomly paired with
another player whose identity was unknown. The participant was given a binary choice of either
(1) donating money to that person, or (2) not donating money. In each round, the player was passively
exposed to information about the past generosity of the other player. In our study, we successfully
replicated the central result of WM. Participants in our replication gave significantly more money to
partners with higher image scores (more generous reputations) than those with lower image scores
(less generous reputations). This paper also provides a critical review of the methodology of WM and
the study of image scoring.
Keywords: cooperation; reputation; psychology; replication
1. Introduction
“Reputation” refers to knowledge about the typical behavior of an observed individual [1–3].
A numerical index of reputation, called an “image score”, was created in theoretical studies (agent-based
modelling) that aimed to investigate the evolution of cooperation [4]. The image score scale ranged from
–5 to +5 (including a neutral zero), allowing agents to accumulate a negative score for selfishness and a
positive score for generosity. The motivation behind research in this area was the search for solutions to
the “tragedy of the commons”, a common phenomenon whereby a useful or necessary public good is
diminished (perhaps fatally) because of overconsumption by self-interested parties [5]. The evolution of
cooperation (that which would solve the tragedy) requires a complex and multi-faceted explanation [6].
Indirect reciprocity [7,8] is just one proposed solution to the tragedy of the commons, expressed in
positive form as “A observed B help C, therefore A helps B” [2]: generosity becomes self-serving
because the generosity itself might be rewarded [1,7]. A substantial number of agent-based models
have been published [8] that explore the conditions that allow indirect reciprocity, notably that of
Nowak and Sigmund [4], who found that a discriminating “image scoring” strategy (give only to those
who have given to others) was an evolutionarily stable strategy in contrast to undiscriminating/selfish
strategies. Following the Nowak and Sigmund model [4], Wedekind and Milinski [9] (hereafter, WM)
published a short paper in Science titled “cooperation by image scoring in humans”. This study
converted the computer simulation into a psychology experiment, using actual human participants
(instead of “agents” in a model). The results of this human study appeared to provide support for
the conclusions of the Nowak and Sigmund model [4] because the human participants appeared to
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act in accordance to the predictions of the model. In the twenty years since WM [9] was published,
the general methodology of the human studies have become known as the indirect reciprocity game
(IRG). In our new study, we adopt the basic design of the IRG. In doing so, we model our study design
most directly on that of WM. Below, we describe the IRG as we implement it in our current study.
The IRG entails that a group of participants are brought into a group and given a sum of money.
Then, the experimenter proceeds to engineer pairwise encounters between participants (a different
pairing in each round). Upon pairing, the donor and receiver proceed to participate in a version of the
dictator game [10], where the donor makes a unilateral decision about whether to donate money to the
receiver. Participants never choose their own role (donor or receiver). The role of a player is never
fixed, however, because it can change from round to round (often, the role is randomly scheduled by
the computer program). Crucial to the design of the IRG is that the possibility of direct reciprocity
is removed. Players cannot take revenge, nor reward a good deed. There are two ways that direct
reciprocity is prevented. One way is to tell players that they will never be identifiably paired with
the same player in reversed roles. Another way is that the identities of the other players are hidden.
Even though participants are often sitting in the same room together, they do not know with whom they
are being paired in a given round. Because direct reciprocity is not possible, players are consequently
guided toward the perception that they are playing a string of one-shot games. Donors know nothing
about the receiver except for a numerical measure of image score. The image score is an index of a
donor’s generosity in previous rounds. Players who choose to donate to another player are awarded
one point. Players who decline to donate lose one point. Just like in theoretical models (e.g., [4]), a high
score connotes generosity and a low score connotes selfishness. At the end of the game, participants are
paid according to how much money is in their account. Participants had been allocated a sum at the
beginning of the study. During the game, money was very likely added to the account (due to being
generous) or subtracted from the account (due to being selfish). IRG is also called a “donor game” by
some authors. In the following, some figures from WM are specifically mentioned. To avoid confusion
with figures in our current paper, the figures from WM are prefixed by “WM-” (e.g., WM-Figure 2
refers to Figure 2 in their paper).
In the WM [9] version of the IRG, they tested seventy-nine human participants. Their main result
was that reputation played a significant role in the participants’ decisions about whom to reward.
Participants who received more money had higher image scores (for more details see Table 1 and
discussion below). This result was interpreted as a demonstration of the importance of reputation as an
explanatory factor in why we cooperate. The WM paper [9] can justifiably be described as influential,
because, to date, it has been cited more than 900 times. We carefully combed over these citations and
found that the vast majority of the citations were brief and uncritical, used as theoretical background
in literature reviews (e.g., in Ref. [11]). Among the 900+ citations, we found only nine papers [12–20]
that we considered to be replications. All of them successfully replicated WM. Table 1 is a summary of
these replications, compared against the original WM paper (Ref. [9]) and compared against our own
replication (bottom row). Five of the replications were co-authored by the same people who did the
original study [12–16] and four of the replications were from other groups [17–21]. There were two
criteria that we used for including papers in Table 1. The first was that the replication directly cited
WM [9]. The second criterion was that the replication adopted the basic design of the IRG (as described
in the previous paragraph). This excludes empirical studies of indirect reciprocity which did not use
the IRG (e.g., studies which used the Prisoner’s Dilemma game, PDG, instead). As shown in Table 1,
the replications of WM should probably be called “partial replications”, or “conceptual replications”.
None of those studies used exactly the same methodology, nor the same analysis. This was true even
for those with the same authors as the original [12–16]. Looking at the aims, methods, and results
columns, it is clear that all replications were using the basic IRG design as a core procedure, but adding
new conditions, additional new games (e.g., alternating IRGs with non-IRGs), and new hypotheses
(e.g., Ref. [19] used the IRG paradigm to study strategic reputation building, something that WM
had not investigated). In Table 1 (third and fourth columns), one can also see great variation in the
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parameters. The mean sample size (refs. [12–20]; n = 10 studies) was 128.8 participants (std. dev. = 55.09),
median 114, range 79–228. The mean group size (students playing together; n = 134 groups) was
8.45 participants (std. dev. = 3.18), median 7.00, range 4–16. The mean number of rounds of the IRG
(n = 10 studies) was approximately 32 rounds (std. dev. ≈ 31.2) (it was not possible to calculate this
precisely due to randomized game-endpoints in Ref. [18]). Also shown in Table 1 (fourth column) is
the length of the history of interactions that allows the donor to evaluate the image score of the receiver.
The history length increases as the game proceeds. At the beginning of the game, the history length is
zero. As shown in Table 1, the studies took two main approaches. Some studies [14,16–20] censored
the history length to a maximum number of rounds. In the studies that did this, the mean maximum
history length was approximately five rounds. Other studies [12,13,15] appeared to maintain a history
length through the duration of the game. Therefore, a study like Ref. [12], for example, had 16 rounds,
allowing a history length of 0–15 rounds (caveat: some of the papers did not mention history length,
and therefore the inference was made that the history consisted of all rounds minus one).
Research using the specific WM design lasted only a few years. Most of the studies in Table 1
were conducted around the early 2000s (this includes refs. [17–19], which were also conducted around
the early 2000s despite being published years later). Only Ref. [20] was conducted much later than the
rest. There have been more recent (post-2015) developments on the study of reputation and indirect
reciprocity, but these have branched out into new and different methods (we review more recent
papers in our Discussion below). In our laboratory, we chose to replicate the original WM [9] paper.
We did this because all of the prior replications [12–20] lack the same analysis as WM. The main claim
of WM is based on a somewhat unusual means of transforming the data. The raw image score of each
player was converted into a “deviation” score. This measured how much higher or lower that player’s
image score was compared to the group average on the given round. WM justified this approach
as useful “to correct for group and round effects” (Ref. [9], p. 851). No further explanation is given,
but presumably this refers to group-specific and round-specific confounds that influence the rate of
giving. Following this transformation, there was another unusual aspect, concerning the analysis
which supports the key result. The unusual part is not the statistical procedure (a standard repeated
measures ANOVA was used), but the way that the data were set up. The focus was on the donor’s
perspective. During the course of the game, the donor had a number of opportunities to donate money.
In each round, the question for the donor was always a YES or NO. In a given round, the donor is
paired with a receiver, and the receiver’s image score is shown. The donor’s choice is whether or not to
donate money to that receiver. The theoretical expectation in WM [9] was that positive image scores
will be rewarded (YES) and negative image scores punished (NO). However, in the game, the donor
was free to violate this expectation. It was completely possible to unjustly decide YES for a negative
image score and NO for a positive one. Whatever the case, WM splits the donor’s data into two
columns: mean image score for (1) recipients of all YES decisions, and (2) all NO decisions. We believe
that they did it this way because it allowed the binary YES/NO choice to be applied directly to the
image score as encountered by the donor in a given round. WM did not report the descriptive statistics
for the YES column and the NO columns, but the repeated measures ANOVA showed that those
who benefited from YES decisions had significantly higher image scores than those who suffered NO
decisions. WM’s approach, which focused on “type of donors’ decision” (Ref. [9], p. 851) was quite
different from that in the replications that followed. None of the replications [12–20] did it that way.
Yet, all of them were inspired by WM and copied their basic IRG paradigm. In our replication of WM
below, we did our best to adhere to the specifics of the original analysis. We felt it was important to
confirm that the original is replicable.
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Table 1. List of replications, plus original and current study. Abbreviations: WM = Wedekind and Milinski; IRG = indirect reciprocity game; PGG = public goods

















Human experiment to investigate effects shown in
Ref. [4]. Each round gave the participant one
opportunity to donate and two opportunities to
receive. Independent variable was a corrected
version of receiver image score, measured not as
raw value but as deviations from the group mean
in a given round.
“ . . . the image score of the receivers who
were given money... was on average higher
than the score of those who got nothing”
(Ref. [9], p. 851). Compared to more
generous players, less generous players were
more discriminating, giving more to
recipients with higher image scores.





IRG was used as control group in study about the
usefulness of additional, “standing strategy”
information (e.g., when a player had declined to
donate in an instance where recipient was not
deserving). Statistical unit was group, not
participant.
Image scoring was successful (analogous
results to Ref. [9]), but the standing strategy
was not successful. Analysis based on
donations to “NO” player (confederate who
never donated).





The donor, after making the yes/no decision to
donate, was given an additional question of
whether to donate money to UNICEF.
Reputational information was shown for both
decisions. Each group had confederates: “always
yes” and “always no” players.
Both types of generosity (giving to other
players/giving to UNICEF) tended to be
rewarded, including in results of a
mock-election at the end of the game to vote
for other players for student council.





Information about the generosity of other players
was derived from a PGG which alternated with an
IRG in first sixteen rounds. In the first treatment,
the games alternated. In the second treatment,
eight PG games were followed by eight IRG. Last
four rounds consisted of PGG only.
Players who were more generous in the PGG
received more money in IR game. Final PGG
showed very high cooperation if players
uncertain about whether future IRGs would












Investigated the relation between direct and
indirect reciprocity. Each group played three
games: PDG, IRG, then PDG again.
Players who were more generous in the IRG
received more money (as in Ref. [9]) but also
in the subsequent PDG.

















In a similar design to Ref. [14], information about
the generosity of other players was derived from a
PGG which alternated with an IRG. Statistical unit
was group, not participant, in most analyses.
Players who were more generous in the PGG
tended to receive more money in the IRG,
showing that reputational information









Had similar aims to Refs. [12,18]. Manipulated
cost (high/low) and type of information. For the
latter, they distinguished between first-order
(image score) and second-order information (cf.
standing strategy).
Contrary to Ref. [12], giving was highest in
response to second-order information
(compared to first-order and a
no-information control condition). Giving is
higher in the low-cost condition.





Had similar aims to Refs. [12,17]. Manipulated
cost of giving (high/low) and information
(information about past generosity in high/low
cost condition, no-information about past
generosity in high cost condition only. Number of
rounds were designed to be unpredictable (min.
90, avg. 99).
Dependent variable was the fraction of
helping behavior (from 0–1). More
donations occurred in the information
condition and when the cost was low.
Players with best image score tended to
receive more money. Individual strategies









A study of strategic reputation building,
comparing “public” (image score seen by all) and
“private” (image score not seen) conditions. Half
the participants had public scores in the first 40
rounds and private scores in the last 40 rounds
(and vice versa for the other half).
Image scoring was successful. Contributions
were higher when image scores were public
compared to private, suggesting that
participants altered their behavior in
response to being observed. Analysis of
individual results showed a mix of apparent
strategies among players.





A study of reputation building in both direct and
indirect contexts. PGG was alternated with a IRG
(for half the sample) and alternated with a CAG
(for the other half) (there were two types of
alternating scheme: “one-shot” and “iterated”). In
the CAG, players could choose each other in
advance for a directly reciprocal game. Analysis
based on groups rather than individuals.
Image score was derived from the PGG
(rather than in IRG play). The IRG was
successful, but was not the main focus of the
paper. Generosity was higher overall
(including in PGG) for CAG than IRG.
Participant showed an immediate reaction to
the introduction of reputational incentives
(causing them to contribute more).













60 (6 × 10) 12(0–5)
Replication of WM [9], using the same horizon
(0–5 rounds) of reputational information and the
same group sizes, but smaller overall sample.
Unlike in Ref. [9], but like Ref. [19], not every
player played in every round. However, on
average, the randomization allowed six recipient
rounds per player, as in Ref. [9]. Image scores
were displayed only to donor in a given pairing
(like private condition in Ref. [19], but unlike the
displays of most other refs).
The main result of WM [9] was replicated,
using the analysis where image score was
measured as deviations from the group
mean in a given round, contrasting those
who received a high amount versus a low
amount of money. See main article for
details of methodology and further analyses.
1. This excludes PDG rounds played before and after the IRG rounds. 2. This includes six PGG rounds alternating with IRG rounds (included because PGG contributed to reputation). 3.
Earlier versions of this study are reported in Ref. [21].
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We know that some readers may question the value of replicating such an old paper. Our response
is that, in the context of the “replication crisis” in psychology [22], replications can be considered as
opportunities to look forward as well as backward [23]: replications can lead to the development of new
methods for paradigms that perhaps need to be rethought. Furthermore, each new replication adds a
data point to quantitative analyses of the success/failure rates of replications [22]. Finally, we can also
point to equivalent replication programmes in other areas of psychology. The 1963 Milgram [24] study
of obedience is a good example. That classic paper has been replicated umpteen times as a means of
probing the nature of obedience as thoroughly as possible [25]. Replications of Milgram [24] continue
to the present day, utilizing the most modern methodologies and theoretical perspectives [26]. We think
that the WM study [9]—like the Milgram study [24]—deserves to be explored further, allowing us,
in future, to probe the effects of reputation as thoroughly as possible.
2. Results
In our replication, the main result of WM [9] was replicated. Data files and other material
are viewable in the Supplementary Material (Documents S1–S12). In summary, we found that
players provided YES decisions preferentially to receivers who had higher image scores in contrast
to the receivers who received NO decisions. Our methods differed in several small ways from WM
(see Methods for details), but produced directly comparable results. Figure 1 is modelled directly on
WM-Figure 2. As shown, there were six groups of players. To conduct an equivalent analysis to WM
(as described in our introduction), we measured image score as individual deviations from the mean
image score for the group and round that a player is in. Thus, if the group mean for in a given round
were +0.2, but an individual’s raw image score were −1 in that round, then that individual’s adjusted
image score is −1.2. The overall mean for adjusted image score was 0.00 (std. dev. = 2.90). We then
calculated two other variables: image scores of individuals who (1) received and (2) did not receive
a donation in a given round (i.e., YES-donate, NO-donate). The first step of this calculation was to
identify the recipient in every round and determine their adjusted image score at the beginning of the
round (i.e., the image score perceived by the donor before making a choice). In the data file (Document
S9) where the rows were participants, the image score of the recipient would be inputted into the row
of the donor. For example, if participant 47 was the donor in round 10 and participant 46 was the
receiver, then participant 46′s image score was inputted into participant 47′s row as the image score
of the receiver from the point of view of participant 47 in that round. Thereafter, for every player,
two variables were created that were the mean adjusted image scores of all recipients to which a player
had (1) donated, or (2) not donated. The overall mean adjusted image score for recipients (from the
point of view of the donor) was 0.92 (std. dev. = 0.97; range –2.00 to +2.90; n = 58) for those who
received donations, and −0.46 (std. dev. = 1.47; range -4.20 to +2.10; n = 42) for those who were declined
donations. Because this was a comparison of two separate variables, the analysis below included only
those players who were seen to make both decisions (YES-donate; NO-decline donation) during their
play. Players who were all-yes (n = 8) and all-no (n = 3) were therefore excluded. A repeated measures
ANOVA (the same analysis as WM) was then conducted with donors as replicates using the two
aforementioned variables (if the donor gives or not) as the within-subjects variables and with groups of
individuals as between-subjects factors. The effect of image score in giving/not giving was significant,
F(1, 34) = 6.563, p = 0.015, η2p = 0.1618, but there was no significant effect of group, F(5, 34) = 0.346,
p = 0.881, η2p = 0.0484, and no significant interaction, F(5, 34) = 1.093, p = 0.382, η2p = 0.1384.
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Figure 1. Image score of receivers when money given (black bars) or not (white bars).
We decided to perform an alternative analysis, to confirm that the WM result was not an artefact
of their choice of analysis. WM had partitioned receiver’s image score into two separate variables,
according to whether they were (1) YES versus (2) NO decisions. In contrast, we decided to merge
receiver’s image score into a single variable. We constructed a logistic GLMM (generalized linear
mixed model) using donor trial as repeated measures and a binomial distribution with a logit link.
The donor trial referred to every instance that a player was assigned the donor role by the computer
program (these varied across participants; see Methods). The opportunity to donate was randomly
assigned, not fixed to a particular round. For example, looking at the data file, we see that participant
one had five opportunities to donate and these occurred in rounds 2, 5, 7, and 8. Player two, in contrast,
had four opportunities to donate and these occurred in rounds 3, 4, 10, and 12. All players had a
different pattern in this regard. That is why the donor trial is differentiated from the game round.
There was a significant positive correlation between receiver image score (original) and the donor trial,
rho = 0.214, p < 0.001, which shows the accumulative nature of the image score (the same correlation
was not significant using the adjusted image score). The binary target (dependent variable) was the
yes-no decision about whether or not to donate money to the recipient in a given round (hereafter
called “decision”). This new analysis required the construction of a new data file where each row
in an SPSS file recorded a player’s decision in a given round. This created a file with 330 decisions
made by sixty players. A player’s group membership and ID number was recorded in columns,
allowing a data structure where participants were nested within their testing groups. The random
effect was therefore the testing group (n = 6). In the datafile, we made two exclusions. One is that
we excluded all decisions from the first round. We did this because it was too early to accumulate
an image score in the first round. Second, we excluded all-YES and all-NO players (leaving n = 49).
The number of exclusions was therefore the same as in the repeated measures ANOVA reported
above. The results below were not significant unless these exclusions were applied. The fixed effect
(independent variable) was the image score of the recipient in a given round. We ran the test using
both versions of the receiver’s image score (original and adjusted). The result was significant for the
adjusted image score only, BIC (Bayesian Information Criterion) = 895.783, fixed effects F = 4.767,
df = 192, p = 0.030, fixed co-efficient = 0.178 ± 0.082, t = 2.183, p = 0.030. The co-variance parameters
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for each donor trial (from second to ninth opportunity) were: second (n = 41), β ± std. err. = 0.765,
Z = 4.216, p < 0.001, third (n = 40) β ± std. err. = 0.923, Z = 4.431, p < 0.001, fourth (n = 38) β ± std.
err. = 1.057, Z = 4.272, p < 0.001; fifth (n = 33) β ± std. err. = 1.183, Z = 4.013, p < 0.001; sixth (n = 25)
β ± std. err. = 1.351, Z = 3.433, p = 0.001; seventh (n = 12) β ± std. err. = 1.679; eighth (n = 4) β ± std.
err. = 1.024, Z = 1.395, p = 0.163; ninth (n = 1) β ± std. err. = 1.475, Z = 0.686, p = 0.493.
Next, we addressed another analysis from WM. In WM-Figure 3, they showed an analysis that
suggested that players with lower image scores appeared to be more discriminating than players with
higher image scores. Their y-axis was “image score of receivers who get something” and their x-axis
was “number of donations (donor image score at the end)”. As with our Figure 1 above, the image
score was the adjusted one that measured the deviations per group and round. Using a Kruskal–Wallis
test, they found that players who accumulated higher image scores tended to donate money to players
with image scores significantly lower than those players who had accumulated lower image scores.
We did the same analysis, using our YES corrected image score variable as the dependent variable,
and a simple count of the amount of donor’s donations as the independent variable. In contrast to
WM, our result was not significant (Kruskal–Wallis H = 8.145, df = 8, p = 0.419).
The extent of payoffs vary widely across participants for a number of reasons. Because of
randomization in the way that the computer program paired players, players had unequal chances to
donate and receive (i.e., some players had more turns than others). The mean amount of donations
was 4.20 (std. dev. = 2.02). The mean income at the end of the game was £10.28 GBP (std. dev. = 3.55),
range £1.50–19.00 (for context, a typical 500 mL bottle of cola in nearby shops costed £1.00 at that
time). Income was inversely correlated with the number of chances to donate, Pearson r = −0.722,
p < 0.001, and positively correlated with the number of chances to receive, r = 0.722, p < 0.001. Also,
income was inversely correlated with the number of donations actually made, Pearson r = −0.521,
p < 0.001. Image score was calculated the same way as in Nowak and Sigmund [4]: starting at zero
at round one; the allocation thereafter was +1 for every donation and –1 for every non-donation
(e.g., a donation followed by two non-donations would yield a score of –1). Overall image score of all
players at the end of the game was 1.98 (std. dev. = 2.66), range −5 to +5. The correlation between end
income and (uncorrected) end image score (i.e., score at the beginning of round 12) was not significant,
Pearson r = −0.144, p = 0.273.
3. Discussion
We successfully replicated the key result of WM, showing that, from the donor’s perspective,
the partner’s image score played a role in the decision-making about whether or not to donate money
to a given recipient. We took care to conduct the same analysis as WM did (compare WM-Figure 2
to our Figure 1). In an alternate analysis of the same data, we found that their main result held up.
This shows that WM’s results were not simply an artefact of their unusual analysis. However, we did
not successfully replicate WM’s results that appear to show that players with lower image scores are
more discriminating in whom they choose to reward (WM-Figure 3). One possible explanation for
this latter result is that players with higher image scores were more attentive to the image-scoring
stimuli (or, conversely, that those with lower image scores were particularly inattentive). This is only
conjecture on our part, and would need further study to ascertain why this particular result contradicts
that of WM.
We acknowledge the limitations of our study. Despite our attempts to hew closely to WM’s
methodology and analysis, it was unavoidable that we deviated in a number of ways (see Methods
for details). One obvious (but easily forgiven) deviation was with respect to the actual machinery
used in WM (see WM-Figure 1). Their slightly antiquated physical set-up consisted of metal boxes,
tangled wires, and light bulbs. Instead of attempting to reconstruct their non-computerized testing
room, we used PCs, using the z-Tree software [27]. Another deviation (perhaps, less easily forgivable)
is that we chose to differentiate our procedures from WM in terms of the number of trials, number of
rounds, group size, and history length (see Table 1). That said, our study has several characteristics
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that provided an analogous experience to WM. For example, our range of history length was the same
as theirs. Players in WM had six opportunities to donate and this allowed the viewing of up to five
previous interactions (image scoring points gained in the final round was not viewed by other players
because the game was done). In our study, players had a variable amount of opportunities to donate,
but the history length was capped at five. Another example of how we provided a roughly equivalent
experience is that the player in our had roughly six opportunities to be a donor. In WM, there were
six rounds where participants interacted with other players thrice (once as donor, twice as receiver).
This is a different definition of “round” from follow-up studies (Table 1) where each round consisted of
a single decision and the players stayed in the same role within a round (they did not switch roles
until there was a new round). Therefore, WM’s game had de facto eighteen rounds of play (if you
adopt the definition of “round” used in our study and other studies in Table 1). In our study, all role
designations were randomized, which caused a range of two to nine opportunities to donate, but with
a population mean of six times (approximating the random six times of WM). Another parallel to
WM is that our group sizes were the same. We had ten participants in every group (WM had one
group with nine players, which we conjecture was not planned, but due to a no-show participant).
Despite the similarities mentioned above, our study did differ in important ways. Notably, we had
~25% fewer participants then WM did. In Table 1, our study has the lowest number of participants.
Obviously, a larger sample size would have provided better statistical power. Our sample size was not
larger because we had significant budgetary and time constraints at the time that the study was run.
However, the replication was successful, despite our smaller sample size.
Another thing to mention is that the computer program was not programmed to exactly match
the parameters of WM. In creating our program, we obtained the file that was used to program
Ref. [19] (generously donated to us by the creator of Z-tree). During programming, we decided to
retain a number of the features in that program, rather than altering the program to the furthest
extent to more closely resemble the original procedure in WM (see Methods for a summary of all
differences between WM and our study). For example, there was no obvious reason to create the
same system of rounds as WM did, when the round system used in Ref. [19] accomplished generally
the same thing. However, one difference between WM and our study that we should particularly
mention is that we did not display the image scores on a large screen for all players to see (as WM
did). This made the image scores relatively private (only visible to the donor who is paired with that
receiver on the given round). Another issue to mention is that we did not use names at all (a few
studies, e.g., [12], used fake names, such as the names of planetary moons, to “identify” other players).
These two issues (no public screen/no names) made the image score considerably more private than in
WM and replications. Thus, our study resembled the “private” condition in Ref. [19]. Having said
all of the above, we should note that exactness is not always the best way to judge a replication.
As Stroebe and Strack [28] wrote: “A finding may be eminently reproducible and yet constitute a
poor test of a theory” (p. 60). Accordingly, there is some validity in the argument that a conceptual
(as opposed to a methodologically identical) replication is desirable, because it shows that the previous
empirical support for an underlying theory was not merely a quirk that arose out of a particular
operationalization [28]. We argue that the methodology in the present study is functionally equivalent
to that of WM’s, without attempting to recreate every aspect of their design.
Further on the topic of limitations, we should mention that, in our study, we could not guarantee
that the players were strangers to each other, or to the experimenters. In fact, in many cases, we knew
the participants personally and we knew that some players were friends with each other. These issues
may have introduced a confound in that it introduces the possibility of a player behaving pro-socially
due to a desire to achieve a positive self-presentation in front of friends or the experimenters [29].
However, we should mention three counterarguments against the idea that having non-strangers
in the room would have greatly influenced our results. The first is that most people in the room
were definitely strangers to each other, many having been recruited from outside the psychology
department. Another counterargument is that all players’ actions were anonymous. Personal identities
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were never linked to the image scores in the dyad. All players knew that, on a particular pairing,
they were playing with someone else in the room, but they did not know the identity of that person.
A third counterargument is that all players knew it was a game. They had received some rather
opaque instructions on how to earn money. It is possible that players did not construe not-giving
as a “selfish” thing to do. The act of not-giving may have been considered a gaming strategy rather
than a personality assessment. Thus, players who were sitting in a room with non-strangers may
not have felt inhibited in adopting a competitive (“selfish”) strategy. On the “game-playing” issue
itself, we acknowledge the issue of external validity that accompanies laboratory experimentation.
Do players in the game-world behave differently from players in real-world? If so, then do results in
our study, even if internally valid, apply to real world image scoring? It has long been recognized [30]
that behavioral laboratory experiments are subject to criticisms of their artificiality (when comparing
laboratory versus field studies, the trade-off involves control versus real-life applicability). One way to
make progress on the problem of external validity is to design future experiments that incorporate
some new element of realism. For example, later in our discussion, we summarize new studies of
image scoring that take into account the real-life imperfections of social perception (e.g., Ref. [31]).
On the topic of “opaque instructions” (see Document S1 in Supplementary information) we had a
situation where we had to facilitate image scoring without overtly directing the player to reward the
observed generosity of others. We told them that they could earn money without telling them how
(hence the opaqueness). Players were not instructed to pay attention to an “image score” (the term and
its theoretical background was not mentioned at all, until the debriefing). If one scrutinizes our data
file (e.g., Document S9 in Supplementary information), then it is quickly apparent that the image score
was a hit-or-miss determinant of whether participants decided YES or NO. The data files show many
instances of NO decisions on high image scores and YES decisions on low image scores. However,
as our results show, the image score had a significant effect on YES/NO decisions on average. This result
would suggest that we found the right balance in our instructions, nudging participants toward
utilizing image score, but obscuring the importance of the image score in an opaque set of instructions.
There are further theoretical limitations to mention. For example, despite the success of our
replication, we should note that we have demonstrated image scoring, but not the whole cycle of
indirect reciprocity. In our study (as in WM), generosity did not pay off. In fact, those who earned the
most were those who contributed the least. At first, this may seem to undermine the idea of indirect
reciprocity (where the principle is that generous individuals prosper and selfish individuals suffer).
However, we think that the reason that selfish players benefited is due to the short-term nature of
the game. The procedure consisted of only twelve rounds, giving insufficient time for generosity to
pay off. A longer-term game may have been different. There is also the depersonalized nature of
the game. As mentioned above, players never knew exactly with whom they were playing. In this
paradigm, reputation is stripped down to only one characteristic: their donation history. This was
enough to show image scoring in the abstract, but it might be useful to conduct new versions of this
experimental paradigm, where more personal relationships are established and using longer time
frames. Indirect reciprocity has been shown to work in numerous theoretical studies (e.g., Ref. [4]),
but it would also be worthwhile to explore future paradigms that provide naturalistic settings for
their participants. Additionally, it would be useful to learn the participant’s point of view in the game.
Looking at our results, should we conclude that participants engaged in image scoring because of a
genuine desire to reward goodness? Or, should we conclude that they engaged in image scoring as
a deliberate strategy of profit-maximization? These questions relate to the longstanding debates in
behavioral economics [32] about whether or not game players behave pro-socially because of some
inherent “other-regarding” niceness (the alternative explanation being that apparent niceness is a
by-product of selfish motivations). It is well-known that players spontaneously adopt a diversity of
strategies when playing economic games [17,33–35] and it would be fair to state that the broad results
of studies, as typically reported, are shrouding the heterogeneity of player strategies. It should be more
commonplace to investigate such strategies, knowing that the micro patterns upwardly determine the
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macro patterns. Another, important, means of assessing individual experience is to gauge sensitivity to
parameter difference. Take the example of history length (cf. Table 1). In our study and others, history
lengths varied widely, often in the 5–6 round range, but often higher. Some studies (e.g., Ref. [17]) go
as low as one round of history length. In empirical research, some studies have shown that differences
in history length can impose significant effects on game play, but other studies have not [36,37].
It should be noted that the original agent-based model by Nowak and Sigmund [4]—which
inspired WM [9]—has been strongly criticized. Leimar and Hammerstein [38], for example, ran their
own agent-based model that exposed weaknesses in Nowak and Sigmund’s study. Their “island
model” simulation produced conditions that favored a more sophisticated strategy called the “good
standing” strategy, which allowed acts of non-cooperation to have no detrimental effect on one’s image
score if the prospective recipient was known to be undeserving of a donation (i.e., “A observed B refuse
to give to C, therefore A refuses to give to B”). Subsequently, there have been real-life psychology
experiments that have strove to demonstrate “standing strategy”. Looking at two early studies
(see Table 1), one found evidence for the standing strategy [17], but another one did not [12]. In a more
recent and sophisticated study, Okada et al. [31] argued that, when thinking about the reputations of
others, real-life decision-making does not consider all of the available information. In fact, they argue,
researchers should focus on the reality of selective inattention: reputational information is multi-faceted
and consists of different types of information (such as “what” data, the actions of player/donors,
and “whom” data, the actions of recipients). Using an IRG-style paradigm, Okada et al. [31] presented
participants with a number of different patterns of information prior to the decision about whether
or not to donate. They found that participants were selective in the information that they utilized
for making a decisions to donate to another recipient, attending to some information, but ignoring
other information. On a similar topic, Hilbe et al. [39] published an agent-based model (a descendent
of the Nowak and Sigmund [4] study) that explored the effects of “private, noisy, and incomplete
information” (Ref. [39], p. 12241) on the processes of indirect reciprocity. In their results, they found
that the introduction of errors caused previously known models of indirect reciprocity to become
unstable. This model is an example of how tricky it is to increase the realism of agent-based modelling
(i.e., a better approximation of the complexities of real life cooperation). Similarly, the psychology
experiment of Duca and Nax [40] was an attempt to introduce more realism by exploring cooperative
situations that go beyond pairwise interactions. They presented their participants with different
variations on image scoring: besides the standard image scoring mechanism (as in WM), they had
other versions such as group scoring (all members of the group get the same score) and self-scoring
(where players manually assign scores to others). Their analysis found that the group methods were
not an improvement over WM-style imaging score in terms of preventing the decay of cooperation.
Judging from these recent studies, there are exciting possibilities opening up in research in regards to
our understanding of how image scoring operates in the natural world.
4. Materials and Methods
Sixty naïve participants (25 males, 35 females, mean age 22.58, std. dev. = 3.96) were recruited in 2017
from students at Middlesex University (London, UK) and from personal contacts of the investigators.
Participants were paid for their participation in varying amounts, contingent on the outcome of the
game (see details below). The game was designed using z-Tree [27], version 3.5.1 (University of Zurich,
Zurich, Switzerland, and Thurgau Institute of Economics, Kreuzlingen, Switzerland). A template
program for an indirect reciprocity game (the one used in Engelmann and Fischbacher, [19]) was
obtained from the creator of z-Tree. The hardware used in WM was unavailable (e.g., metal boxes,
wires, and lightbulbs). The template program in z-Tree was adapted to fit the WM paradigm, but we
decided to retain six features of the Engelmann and Fischbacher [19] study: (1) Participants were
randomly paired in each round; (2) they were randomly allocated as donor or receiver within a round;
(3) image score was calculated for the most recent five donation rounds only; (4) image score was
displayed on the individual’s screen rather than on a public board; (5) there were no cues to the
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partner’s identity at all (in the original study, players were labelled by number); and (6) there were
twelve rounds instead of six. The purpose of choosing twelve rounds was that it gave every participant
the possibility (subject to random variation) of donating six times and receiving six times (in the
original study, participants had six definite chances to donate and six definite chances to receive, across
six multi-event rounds). In our study, the computer program gave players a mean number of six
opportunities to donate (std. dev. = 1.54; range 2–9), and six opportunities to receive (std. dev. = 1.54;
range 3–10). Original data files are shown in Supplementary Material (Documents S1–S9). The Z-tree
programming code is shown in Supplementary Material (Document S10).
University computer rooms were used, which consisted of ten PCs for participants and an eleventh
PC for investigators. Screen sizes were 34 × 27 cm for participants and the classroom screen was
185 × 105 cm. Opaque white plastic dividers were placed in between adjacent players. Participants also
received an information sheet, consent form, debriefing sheet, and payment with receipt. During the
game, participants viewed a series of screens that provided information: current balance (in GBP),
indication of game round (1–12), description of player’s status in current round (donor/receiver),
and all/some of the following information about player history: (1) If receiver in previous round,
whether that player received money or not; (2) if donor in current round, then past donating behavior
(e.g., “in the last 5 rounds as donor, you gave money 2 times and 3 times you did not give money”),
and (3) if donor in current round, then donating history of prospective recipient (e.g., “The other
person’s record: In the last 5 times as donor, this person gave out money 3 times and did not give out
money 2 times”). Also, for the donor, a choice was presented: (1) give £0.50 GBP to partner, or (2),
nothing. If receiver, the participant saw a message to wait. Screenshots of the game are shown in
Supplementary Material (Document S11).
Upon entry to the testing room, participants were asked to sit at designated computers and then
read/sign an information sheet and consent form. The investigator then presented a Powerpoint slide
show (duration ~3 min.) on the main screen that further explained the game: (1) There are twelve
rounds; in each round, (2) the computer randomly chooses your role (donor/receiver) (3) and the
computer randomly pairs you with someone else in room, (4) all identities hidden, (5) all players
present in room, (6) if donor, choice to give (£0.50/nothing), (7) if receiver, wait for round to end,
(8) multiplying rule (every donation multiplied by four, hence donor gives £0.50, recipient gets £2),
(9) participants have £4.00 at start of game, (10), you could gain or lose money, (11) you are paid
the money “won” at end of game. The aim of the game was stated as maximizing income, but no
information was provided on how to achieve it. The slideshow is shown in Supplementary Material
(Document S12). There were six groups of ten players. In each round, participants were designated
either as donor or receiver and partnered with a player in the opposite role. This role/pairing alternated
between rounds. After twelve rounds, the players saw a final screen indicating how much money
they had “won”, and then another screen prompting them to indicate age and sex. Participants were
debriefed and then paid. There was no separate show-up fee.
Supplementary Materials: The following are available online at http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/11/4/58/s1.
Document S1: Explanatory document for data files. Documents S2–S7: Z-tree output files. Document S8: Main
SPSS datafile. Document S9: Secondary SPSS datafile. Document S10: Z-tree programming code. Document S11:
Some screenshots of game. Document S12: Slideshow presentation for participants at beginning of study.
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